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COLLEGIALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY 
Tobias Barrington Wolff* 
This Essay is a direct transcription of the remarks that I offered at the 
Fordham Law School Symposium out of which this volume grows.  I have 
made very minor edits to remove superfluous words and verbal tics, and I 
have restructured a pair of sentences for clarity, but I have otherwise left 
the transcript intact as delivered.  I did not originally plan to publish these 
remarks and spoke without notes, so I beg the reader’s indulgence.  In 
preparing this transcript for publication, I have added what I consider to be 
the bare minimum of footnotes, principally to account properly for my 
discussion of the work of other scholars. 
What I want to spend my time talking about today is a more serious 
issue, an issue that is very personal for me.  It is the deep tension that exists 
for LGBT scholars and lawyers who work on these issues between 
principles of collegiality and basic principles of individual and human 
dignity. 
By principles of collegiality, what I mean is not just the social politeness 
and nicety that we try to abide by in the Academy, but also what I see as a 
particular feature of academic collegiality that is important to the 
profession.  We, as scholars, come to fellow scholars with a strong 
presumption that the ideas that our fellow scholars are articulating and 
exploring are entitled to be “treated with” in a serious fashion—are entitled 
to be accorded a presumption of good-faith effort to sort through a set of 
difficult ideas, even when we come to different conclusions and have strong 
disagreements with our colleagues.  I think that there are at least two 
reasons why we embrace that norm of collegiality within the profession.  
One is a scholarly reason:  it is a norm that reinforces the mindset of a 
serious academic or a serious scholar in being prepared to question ideas, in 
being prepared always to revisit one’s own conclusions despite one’s own 
certainty about those conclusions. 
*  Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I am grateful for the 
opportunity to publish these remarks, and to Professor Joe Landau for his hard work and 
good judgment, and I thank Peter Pazzaglini for his intellectual inspiration, spiritual 
guidance and irreplaceable friendship.  I dedicate this address to the millions of courageous 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning Americans who must struggle with these 
issues every day without the privilege of the Academy to augment their voices and the safety 
of tenure to guard them from harm. 
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But it also reflects what I think is one of the characteristic challenges of 
doing serious scholarly work.  The effort to undertake a sustained analysis 
of difficult issues over time and to articulate those ideas in writing or in 
presentations like this, to submit oneself for criticism, is not just an 
intellectually difficult endeavor; it is an emotionally difficult endeavor.  I 
think that scholars—it is something that we don’t talk about a lot in the 
profession, but I think it is a challenging and threatening thing to do the 
work that we do and to try to do it well and to try to do it in a responsible 
fashion.  The norm of collegiality is in part a recognition of that dynamic of 
the work of a scholar:  that it is difficult to explore ideas in a sustained 
fashion, to present the results of one’s work and to submit one’s work for 
criticism and the possibility that you’re going to be publicly proven wrong 
or publicly shown not to be as clever as you would like people to think you 
are, and so forth.  That’s hard work.  And I think that the norms of 
collegiality are partly defined and enforced in order to reinforce the 
scholarly norms of the profession but also to reinforce the ability of 
scholars to do that work.  These norms are very important to me and I take 
them very seriously. 
As a gay man and a scholar who works on these issues, I have found over 
the past twelve years that I have been a full-time scholar that this norm 
comes into conflict with some basic principles of individual and human 
dignity for me—specifically, when I am encountering scholars who are 
making arguments about me and about the ten million other Americans with 
whom I share the experience of being an LGBT person that are 
dehumanizing and that feel like, and I think by any objective standard 
constitute, an assault upon one’s most basic sense of safety and belonging 
in a civil community, and one’s most basic sense of being able to hold one’s 
head up with a certain measure of dignity in these kinds of difficult 
intellectual and scholarly and public policy discussions that we have.  That 
tension between those two important principles characterizes, certainly for 
me and I think probably for a lot of LGBT scholars and lawyers as well, a 
lot of the work that we do in this field.  Let me say a couple of words 
specifically about what I mean and the way that these arguments get 
deployed in the field. 
I will talk about three of the arguments that opponents of equal treatment 
for gay and lesbian couples in general, and specifically with respect to 
marriage, often rely upon.  The first has to do with kids and the ability of 
same-sex couples to be successful parents for their kids.  You hear 
constantly in public discourse, and you see constantly in litigation and in 
public policy debates, arguments about how the reason why gay and lesbian 
couples need to be excluded from the civil institution of marriage, and 
indeed often from civil union and domestic partnership relationships as 
well, is because we need to safeguard the best interests of children and 
secure children a household in which they have both a mother and a father, 
which is the ideal environment in which they can raise children.  Professor 
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Wardle has developed these arguments in some of his writing, and many 
other scholars and lawyers in the field have talked about these arguments.1
Now, there are a number of things to say about this argument.  The first, 
which has been much discussed but is worth articulating once again, is that 
these are arguments that fly in the face of all of the actual social science 
experiments and evidence and empirical data which have attempted to 
measure the question of what are the types of environments in which kids 
do best and are most likely to come out well-adjusted and have successful 
outcomes.  It is the consensus of professional organizations that do this kind 
of work, both psychiatric and child welfare organizations, that this is simply 
a spurious argument and, indeed, there is a wealth of information and a 
wealth of social science data making very clear that what matters to the 
adjustment of kids and successful outcomes of kids is the nature of their 
relationships with their parents, the nature of their parents’ relationships 
with each other, and the economic and social resources that they have 
available to them as kids, and that in fact the sex and the sexual orientation 
of their parents makes absolutely no difference to the outcome of these 
kids.2
You see a lot of scholars attempting to make the argument on the other 
side by doing things like pointing to studies that simply study straight 
couples—opposite-sex parents—and that point to various different deficits 
that kids can experience when they are raised in various different forms of 
problematic or challenged opposite-sex households in which one or another 
parent is absent through divorce, or is disengaged because only a step-
parent and not terribly invested in the children, and so forth.  They point to 
this and say, “See, this demonstrates that kids do best when they have a 
1. See, e.g., Lynn Wardle, The Disintegration of Families and Children’s Right to 
Their Parents, 10 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2011); Marriage Talking Points, NAT’L ORG.
MARRIAGE, http://www.nationformarriage.org/site/c.omL2KeN0LzH/b.4475595/k.566A/
Marriage_Talking_Points.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (“Marriage is about bringing 
together men and women so children can have mothers and fathers.”); see also Tracye 
Hansen, Same-Sex Marriage:  Not in the Best Interest of Children, THERAPIST, May/June 
2009, available at http://www.drtraycehansen.com/Pages/writings_notinthebest.html.  
Tracye Hansen describes herself as a “Psychologist, Cultural Commentator & Author,” id.,
and her work is promoted on the Ruth Institute website, which is a project of the National 
Organization for Marriage website. 
 2. Professor Michael Lamb, Professor of Psychology and Head of the Department of 
Social and Developmental Psychology at Cambridge University and one of the world’s 
leading experts on child development and parental relationships, summarizes the state of the 
social science and the consensus of serious professional and scholarly associations regarding 
child welfare and gay parents in an affidavit that he submitted in conjunction with a 
challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act brought in the Northern District of 
California by Karen Golinski. See Declaration of Michael Lamb in Support of Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment & Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ & Defendant-
Intervenor’s Motions to Dismiss, Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 
968 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 3:10-cv-0257-JSW), 2011 WL 7472740 [hereinafter Lamb 
Declaration].  The Williams Institute at UCLA Law School has collected a significant 
amount of the social science research and meta-analysis in the parenting section of its 
electronic research center.  See Parenting, WILLIAMS INST., http://williamsinstitute.law.
ucla.edu/category/research/parenting/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
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biological mother and a father.  Therefore, same-sex couples should not be 
allowed to get married.”3  Well, of course, that has nothing to do with the 
question of whether same-sex couples can be successful parents.  These are 
studies that measure various different variations on opposite-sex 
households, and they reinforce the notion that having successful outcomes 
with your kids depends upon having engaged parents with good 
relationships with their kids, parents who have good relationships with each 
other, and parents who have access to resources, time, and status that allow 
them to create a successful child-rearing environment for their children.  
Indeed, to be perfectly blunt, scholars who attempt to point to these studies 
about problems that various different kinds of heterosexual households have 
as evidence that there is some reason why gay couples should not be 
parenting kids, or should not be supported and reinforced in parenting their 
kids, are either guilty of extraordinary incompetence or they are engaged in 
willful misrepresentation of the data.  There is no other way to describe the 
way that these studies are being made use of. 
That is a very important fact to discuss about the way in which these 
social science data get used, but there are two issues that it is more 
important to discuss.  First of all, even if there were any truth to the 
proposition that, on average, opposite-sex couples have better outcomes 
with their kids than same-sex couples, why would that be a justification for 
excluding same-sex couples from the various different kinds of state 
support and state reinforcement that we offer to parents in order to help 
ensure that they have successful outcomes for their kids?  What we know is 
that poor parents have much greater challenges having successful outcomes 
with their kids and having well-adjusted kids because access to resources is 
directly correlated with having unsuccessful or problematic outcomes with 
kids—at least, a greater chance of a problematic outcome with kids.4  And 
yet, of course, appropriately, our public policy response to parents that have 
not very much access to resources is to try to give them more support, or at 
least to try to reinforce their ability to parent their own children, rather than 
saying, “You’re poor?  You shouldn’t get married.  We’re not going to let 
you get married, because you’re going to have less good outcomes with 
your kids.” 
3. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 1, at 33–36, which describes the children of same-sex 
couples as suffering from “parental absence” and projects onto kids raised by loving same-
sex couples the greater risk of poor outcomes experienced by kids from homes characterized 
by divorce or single parenthood. See also, e.g., Lynn Wardle, Parentlessness:  Adoption 
Problems, Paradigms, Policies, and Parameters, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 323, 
324–25 (2005) (conflating the “parentlessness” of children raised by same-sex couples with 
the circumstances of orphans, homeless persons, and “children in refugee camps”).  To 
eliminate any possibility of confusion, the text in quotation marks in the body of the Essay 
above is a stylized account of the arguments made by Professor Wardle and others, not a 
direct quote from the cited articles. 
4. See, e.g., Lamb Declaration, supra note 2, ¶ 16 (explaining that “poverty and social 
isolation [are] associated with maladjustment” while “adequate resources support[] healthy 
adjustment”). 
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It constitutes a sort of magical thinking on the part of antigay advocates 
that, if you can point to some supposed deficit on the part of gay parents—
which, once again, is invented and indeed a misuse of social science data—
then that is a reason to deny them equal treatment under law, because 
somehow they’re not going to have kids if you just deny them equal 
treatment under law and otherwise don’t take them into account under law.  
But of course, gay parents exist, and gay parents are going to exist whether 
we give them equal treatment under our laws or not.  The question that we 
should be addressing is, what is the best way to support these parents in 
light of the social realities in which they live?  And the social reality in 
which they live is that their sex and sexual orientation have nothing to do 
with their ability to have successful outcomes with their kids. 
Perhaps even more important, there is this seeming willingness on the 
part of antigay advocates to go around calling LGBT people unfit parents, 
and to expect to be treated with courtesy in response.  I’ve been doing this 
for a dozen years, and I have to tell you, in very personal terms:  I’m getting 
a little tired of being courteous in response to this kind of argument. 
A second species of argument that gets deployed in these conversations a 
lot is associated with what are often called the New Natural Lawyers—a 
group of scholars and advocates in the Academy most strongly identified 
with Robbie George at Princeton, in the advocacy world most strongly 
identified with the National Organization for Marriage, which is an antigay 
organization that Robbie George had a lot to do with founding.  Here, this is 
an attempt to take natural law arguments, update them to a twenty-first 
century vocabulary, and then apply them to current issues of social 
disputation. 
I’ve read a good deal of the work of Robbie George in this field.  It is 
extraordinarily erudite work.  Robbie George is a very smart man, he writes 
very analytically complicated and dense work.  And it is analytically 
complicated and dense work that has two characteristics that are particularly 
relevant to this discussion.  First of all, George makes a point of 
differentiating his work from the work of other natural law writers who 
have justified legal regulation based on a sociological assessment of the 
content of majoritarian moral sentiment—the Lord Devlin approach to 
natural law analysis from the Devlin-Hart debates5—or that is more 
explicitly tied to Catholic doctrine and to the Christian tradition, which of 
course is the tradition in which Thomas Aquinas was writing.6  Robbie 
George makes a big point of saying, “I am writing about moral propositions 
that I believe to be self-evident or at least rationally derivable and these are 
simply correct moral propositions.  And so I am now going to set forth 
5. See LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965) (collecting 
Devlin’s lectures on the subject). 
 6. Aquinas develops his theories on natural law in the Prima Secundae of the Summa.
See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Parts I–II (Fathers of the English Dominican 
Republic, trans., Encyc. Britannica 1952).
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arguments about policy prescriptions that we should adopt because they 
represent correct moral judgments.”7
He goes on to talk about gay people and gay relationships.  And what 
Robbie George says about gay people and gay relationships is that we are 
base, and we are degraded, and we are morally evil, and we are unfit for 
human beings in the ways in which we conduct our relationships.8
Now, in fairness, Robbie George is fairly ecumenical in his 
condemnation.  He also has some similar things to say about fornicators, 
about sodomists (including married sodomists), and about masturbators.9  I 
must admit, when I was reading his work and came across this last term, it 
took me aback, because it is a way of classifying human beings that had not 
occurred to me—that somehow, the category of people for whom 
masturbation is a meaningful part of their lives is a meaningfully distinct 
category.  And it is work that, for all of its genuine learning and 
intelligence, betrays a kind of fearful and desperate sexual repression, 
which on one level provokes a reaction of human compassion.  I must say 
that, in reading George’s work, I have a powerful reaction of compassion. 
 7. Professor George sets forth his approach to natural law theory most fully in MAKING 
MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1993).  Thus, for example, in 
differentiating his work from that of Lord Devlin, George writes, “I argue that Devlin’s 
defense of morals legislation should be rejected just in so far as it deviates from the 
traditional and correct view that morals laws are morally justified only when the morality 
they enforce is true.” Id. at 5.  Professor George writes in a similar vein in a recent collection 
of essays: 
The thesis I set before you is that a key source of the pathologies afflicting 
marriage in contemporary societies is not . . . the substitute of reason for tradition 
[but rather] the significant erosion . . . of a sound understanding of marriage . . . .  
The problem, in other words, is that many people have lost their grip on the nature 
of the marital good, or goods, and on the reasons for marrying and supporting 
marriage that these goods supply.  The failure is precisely a failure of practical 
understanding—of reason.
Robert P. George, Marriage, Morality, and Rationality, in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE 147–
48 (Robert P. George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., 2006).  Once again, to eliminate any 
possibility of confusion, the text in quotations marks in the body of the Essay above is my 
own account of George’s approach and not a direct quote from his work. 
 8. Professor George explores these ideas at great length in ROBERT P. GEORGE &
PATRICK LEE, BODY-SELF DUALISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS AND POLITICS (2008). See,
e.g., id. at 176–77 (“[N]onmarital sexual acts (including homosexual acts) are intrinsically 
incapable of actualizing or promoting a genuine human good. . . . [and] are always in 
principle contrary to intrinsic personal goods . . . and as such harm the character of those 
freely choosing to engage in them.”); id. at 178 (intimacy between same-sex couples “is a 
degradation of persons”); id. at 186 (describing the intimacy of a same-sex couple as 
“[s]exual acts done for the sole immediate purpose of pleasure, and not intended as 
embodying, expressing, or symbolizing personal communion” and hence constituting 
“masturbatory sex [that] is objectively morally wrong”); id. at 188 (“Masturbatory sex is a 
choice to use one’s sexuality (and perhaps that of others) as a mere means toward pleasure 
and thus involves treating one’s sexuality (and perhaps others’ sexuality) as a mere object for 
use and as subpersonal.”); id. at 189 (“[Mutual masturbatory sex] involves treating a bodily 
person as if he or she were not a person, for here the sexuality of the person, which includes 
both the body and personal expression, is used as a mere extrinsic means.”). 
9. See id. at 188 (“masturbator”), 194–96 (“sodomy”), 196–97 (“fornication”). 
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But I also have a reaction of having to take a step back, if you’ll permit 
me to say it colloquially, and to ask myself:  Exactly how far do I have to 
extend the norms of collegiality to be engaging with somebody whose 
entire work is based upon the assertion that, as a rational moral proposition, 
I am base, and degraded, and morally evil, and behaving in a way that is not 
fit for a human being? 
The third species of argument that I think warrants some critical attention 
is often termed “complementarity,” sometimes called “gender integration” 
in relationships.  This is, if I may say so, a rather opportunistically coined 
set of phrases that are seeking to discuss the inherent need or the inherent 
importance or value of having two people of different genders in a 
marriage, and that that is somehow essentially what a marriage is about.  
Robbie George writes about this as well and many others do, there are 
Catholic scholars who write about this in recent disputation about social 
issues.10
Scholars who emphasize this notion of complementarity make a point of 
saying that they are emphasizing differences in the complementary qualities 
of men and women not just in their physical characteristics but also in their 
intellectual, their emotional, and their spiritual characteristics.11  It is these 
large sources of difference and complementarity, they say, that we ought to 
be recognizing in order to say that marriage is a unique relationship.12
Now, number one, of course, this species of argument transparently and 
almost brazenly accentuates the nature of the sex classification in sex-
differentiated marriage laws.  I find it astonishing that these are the same 
people who are arguing either in their scholarly work or in court that—
despite this “complementarity,” “gender integrated” set of assertions about 
the inherent nature of men and women on intellectual, emotional, and 
spiritual levels as well as physical levels—that discrimination in the 
marriage laws based upon sex does not constitute a classification that 
should be enforceable under the Equal Protection Clause. 
10. See, e.g., Roger Scruton, Sacrilege and Sacrament, in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE,
supra note 7, at 25–28 (2006); Lynn Wardle, The Boundaries of Belonging:  Allegiance, 
Purpose and the Definition of Marriage, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 287, 291 (2011) (“Gender 
integration, uniting a man and woman in a gender-complementary union, is an essential, 
perhaps the most indispensable, purpose of marriage.”).  
11. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schiltz, Does Sarah + John = 3?  The History and Future of 
Complementarity in Catholic Feminism, Keynote Memorial Lecture at The Family:  
Searching for the Fairest Love, Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, Ninth Annual 
Fall Conference (Nov. 7, 2008), available at https://sites.google.com/a/nd.edu/the-notre-
dame-center-for-ethics-and-culture/video/fall-conference-videos/the-family-searching-for-
fairest-love-videos (emphasizing the complementarity of men and women in their physical, 
emotional, intellectual, and spiritual characteristics in seeking to articulate a Catholic 
feminist worldview). 
12. See, e.g., George, supra note 7, at 151 (“The bodily union of [opposite-sex] spouses 
in marital acts is the biological matrix of their marriage as a comprehensive, multilevel 
sharing of life:  that is, a relationship that unites the spouses at the bodily (biological), 
emotional, dispositional, and even spiritual levels of their being.”). 
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But, more broadly, I don’t disregard the notion that there is something 
distinctive about having a relationship with two people of opposite sexes, 
and having them explore their differences of experience as part of what it is 
that they are doing as they travel through the world together.  Just as I take 
very seriously that there is something distinctive and beautiful and 
important about two people of the same sex sharing experiences through a 
common lens, through a common set of shared understandings of what the 
demands of the world are upon them in their gender and the ways in which 
they do or don’t experience those demands in a similar fashion.  The 
complementarity argument simply takes as a given that the opposite-sex 
experience is the one that public policy ought to be accentuating, and that 
the same-sex experience is simply to be differentiated through the 
construction of an argument, rather than to be taken seriously on its own 
terms. 
That kind of not being taken seriously—having that be the starting point 
that one has to begin with in engaging in a collegial fashion with these 
arguments—over time it has a corrosive impact upon one’s individual 
dignity.  The question is what to do about that. 
Now, I have run out of time, so I’m not going to spend a lot of time 
talking about what to do about it.  I’ll just say quickly:  One can refuse to 
engage with these arguments and the people who make them, which is a 
choice that some LGBT scholars make and is a choice that has obvious 
costs associated with it.  One can continue engaging in a collegial fashion, 
which is the choice that I have made for most of my career, but carries 
serious individual costs.  Or one can engage with a somewhat sharper-
edged critique of the nature of the arguments that are being made, which is 
part of what, of course, I am doing today, which has its own set of costs and 
disruptions of the normal collegial atmosphere about it.  I acknowledge that. 
But I think that the impact upon the individual dignity of LGBT scholars 
from having to confront these ugly, ugly arguments over and over again is 
something that needs to be acknowledged as one of the central, central 
dynamics that warrants attention in conversations about these issues. 
Thank you. 
